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Monetary Transmission Under Competing
Corporate Finance Regimes
February 21, 2017
Abstract
The behavioral agent-based framework of De Grauwe and Gerba (2015)
is extended to allow for a counterfactual exercise on the role of corporate
finance arrangements for monetary transmission. Two alternative firm finan-
cial frictions are independently introduced: market-based and bak-based. We
find convincing evidence that the overall monetary transmission channel is
stronger in the bank-based system compared to the market-based. While the
growth in credit is larger in the market-based system, uncertainty originated
from imperfect beliefs produce impulse responses in macroeconomic variables
that are, on average, half of those in the bank-based model. At the same time
we find mixed results on the conditional effectiveness of monetary policy to
offset contractions. Conditional on being in a recession, a monetary expan-
sion in a market-based system creates higher successive booms. That said, a
monetary easing in the bank-based system is more effective in smoothening
the financial-and business cycles.
Keywords: monetary transmissions, banks, corporate finance, business cycle
JEL: E52, E44, E03, G21, G32
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1 Motivation
There is a long line of empirical research highlighting a strong link between firm char-
acteristics, corporate finance structure and monetary policy transmission. Those
studies show that the effectiveness of monetary policy and the asymmetric impact
it will have on the economy over expansions vs recessions is dependent on the type
of firms in the economy and their financing composition. Under the current context
of unconventional policies understanding this link has become even more urgent.
Despite the enormous amount of liquidity injected by central banks, SMEs continue
to face many difficulties to access credit. This is true for both the UK and Euro
Area (EA). For others, such as the US these difficulties have been much less acute.
For emerging markets, access to firm credit is still very problematic despite largely
using conventional monetary policy tools. Yet, all these countries have very differ-
ent corporate financing systems, and their central banks have adopted very different
monetary policy. At the same time, their markets are at very different levels of
market confidence. For this reason it is important to understand the interaction be-
tween monetary policy, market sentiments and credit supply, and examine whether
the observed disparity in monetary policy effectiveness to boost credit and economic
activity depends on the type of financial frictions in an economy.
We incorporate these components in our analysis and examine the role of mon-
etary policy in boosting activity under competing financial regimes. In particular,
we focus on two alternatives: one where firms receive external finances from the
market market-based financing or MBF), and another where they receive it from
banks (bank-based financing or BBF). We include each regime in separate but oth-
erwise identical New-Keynesian models with price rigidities, a borrowing constraint
for firms, financial frictions on the supply side and imperfect credit and capital mar-
kets. Borrowing constraint of firms has significant aggregate effects via the usual
demand-channel, but also a more elaborated supply-channel via imperfect capital
markets. In each version, firms can only access one type of external finance. This
assumption makes the model more tractable and assists in making our key findings
more understandable at the expense of making it somewhat less realistic. Further,
we relax the rational expectations assumption and introduce behavioral dynamics
of De Grauwe (2011) and De Grauwe and Gerba (2015).
Using the models, we wish to answer a number of questions. First, we wish to
structurally uncover whether the source of corporate credit and the type of credit
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channel matters for monetary transmission. Second, we wish to examine the role
of imperfect beliefs and stock markets for credit- and business cycle fluctuations.
Finally, our ultimate aim is to answer a broader (long-standing) issue of whether
monetary policy is more effective in generating and sustaining booms in a MBF or
a BBF system. In other words, is the transmission of monetary policy to firm credit
greater and smoother in one financial system compared to the other. This debate is
nested within a larger contemporary debate of whether MBF systems cause larger
economic instability and make monetary policy less effective in counteracting those.
Therefore, by comparing two alternative yet pure financial regimes, we wish to
highlight the contribution of each to economic (in)stability, and effectively examine
the role that monetary policy has to play for relaxing credit access and smoothen
business cycle fluctuations. Moreover, in the context of emerging markets, we hope
that our findings will contribute to the debate of whether these should adopt market-
based financing structure in order to relax credit access to firms, boost growth and
improve the workings of monetary policy.
In the impulse response analysis, we find that a credit boom caused by a mon-
etary expansion is stronger in a market-based system. The interaction between the
actual drop in interest rate with positive market outlook relaxes the credit constraint
more than proportionally. That said, the impulse response estimates in the MBF
version are much wider which implies that there is a non-negligible probability of
the credit expansion being smaller than in the BBF version. It mainly depends on
the strength of the initial animal spirit channel.
The macroeconomic effects from this expansion, on the other hand, are stronger
in the bank-based version. This is because less of the market uncertainty is passed
through to the real economy, which allows it to expand more. In some sense, the
marginal benefit of a unit of credit is higher in a bank-based financing system.
Interactions between market beliefs and financial frictions can potentially gen-
erate high amplitudes in the financial and business cycles. Longer expansions are
followed by even deeper recessions. The heavy contractions are observed in standard
macroeconomic as well as financial variables. In addition, cycles are asymmetric
around the zero-line. Compared to rational expectations models, this is possible to
generate because of the additional uncertainty (or friction) originating from imper-
fect beliefs.
One level down, these fluctuations (and asymmetries) are higher for financial
variables in the BBF, while they are higher for macroeconomic variables in the MBF.
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This means that even if the additional banking friction in the BBF model generates
greater fluctuations in the credit variables, the pass-through to the real economy is
smoother. Banks absorb some of that volatility using their capital buffers. In the
MBF version, on the other hand, that volatility is directly passed on to borrowers,
who include them in their intertemporal decision-making.
To conclude, we evaluate the effect of monetary expansions conditional on the
economy being in a recession. While interest rate cuts are more frequent and larger
in the BBF model, the total effect on output is more modest. Capital restrictions
and the limited influence of market sentiment in loan supply decisions limit the full-
fledged expansionary effects from interest rate cuts compared to the MBF model.
Then again, if the aim of monetary policy is to reduce the volatility in the economy
(for financial or consumption smoothing purposes), then a monetary policy in the
BBF model accomplishes this objective in a more effective way.
1.1 Literature Review
The current bulk of empirical literature can be summarized into two strands. The
first strand examines the mutual links between firm characteristics and monetary
transmission via the loan supply and bank incentive channel. Kashyap and Stein
(2000) argue that when a central bank tightens policy, aggregate bank lending falls
and a substitution towards non-bank financing, such as commercial paper takes
place. As a result, aggregate investment falls by more than would be predicted
simply by a rise in bank interest rates. This is because small firms that do not have
significant buffer cash holdings are forced to reduce investment around periods of
tight credit. Similarly, small banks seem more prone to reduce lending compared to
large ones due to a lower securities buffers.1In a similar vein, Ehrmann et al (2001)
show in a pan-European study that monetary policy alters loan supply by affecting
the liquidity levels of individual banks. Contrary to the US evidence in Kashyap
and Stein (2000), however, they do not find that the size of banks explain its lending
reaction. In Spain, Jimenez et al (2014) find that lower overnight rates prior to loan
origination push banks to lend more to borrowers with a weaker credit history and
to grant more loans with a higher probability of default. As a result, the lending
1Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1996) extend their initial study above and show that even when
the level effect is accounted for so that large (small) firms increase (reduce) all types of financing
during a monetary tightening, there is a considerable substitution away from bank loans towards
commercial paper. Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel (1995) and Ludvigson (1998) reach the
same conclusion.
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portfolio of banks will be riskier during loose monetary policy conditions due to
banks profit seeking incentives.
The second strand has largely focused on the demand (and balance sheet) chan-
nel of monetary policy. So, for instance, Ashcraft and Campello (2007) argue that
monetary transmission is demand rather than supply driven. The mechanism works
through firm balance sheet and is independent from the bank lending channel. Using
a unique Euro Area survey, Ciccarelli, Maddaloni and Peydro (2014) find that the
majority of the amplification of monetary policy shocks to output (and prices) is
via borrowers’ balance sheet channel.2Peersman and Smets (2005) find asymmetric
(real) effects of monetary tightening. They show that the negative effects of interest
rate increases on output are significantly greater in recessions than in booms. How-
ever, a considerable degree of heterogeneity between industries exists in both the
degree of asymmetry across the business cycle phases and the overall policy effects.
While the second heterogeneity is related to durability of goods produced in the
sectors, the heterogeneity in asymmetry is strongly related to differences in firms’
financial structure (i.e. maturity structure of debt, coverage ratio, firm size and
financial leverage). Hence firm financial composition matters for the asymmetric
effects of monetary policy.
Theoretical contributions that specifically examine monetary transmissions un-
der distinct corporate and banking structures have been, as far as we are aware,
slimmer.3Recently Bhamra, Fisher and Kuehn (2011) have investigated the intertem-
poral corporate effects of monetary policy when firms issue debt with a fixed nominal
coupon. Forward-looking corporate default decisions thus depend on monetary pol-
icy through its impact on future inflation. They find that under a passive peg,
a negative productivity shock coupled with deflation produces strong incentives for
corporate default, which under real costs of financial distress triggers a debt-deflation
spiral.
The framework that most resembles ours is Bolton and Freixas (2006). In an
OLG-type of model with game-theoretic characteristics, they show how monetary
policy can potentially have large firm financing effects. By changing the equilibrium
bank spread between corporate bonds and bank lending, a change in policy interest
rate may induce a switch from a low bank capital base and low levels of bank
2They do find some, but limited evidence of a loan supply channel in their data.
3There is a large literature incorporating various financing regimes of firms in their general
equilibrium modelling. However, models that specifically look at the various (and asymmetric)
effects of monetary policy on firm financing under different regimes have been fewer.
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lending to high capital base and lending (or vice versa) if the change in spread
is large enough. In turn, this determines the total supply of loans, and therefore
the aggregate composition of financing by firms. Firms strictly prefer loans in this
framework because they are easier to restructure. But, they are also more costly
because of their restricted supply constrained by capital regulation. This trade-
off gives rise to endogenous flexibility costs. Imperfect beliefs (or signalling) are
introduced in this model via banks’ incentives to issue equity. Those incentives
depend on the equilibrium investor beliefs. Those beliefs are imperfect because
information is asymmetric and they only interpret the signals emitted by banks via
their actions. Therefore the state (or equilibrium) in which the bank is originally
embedded is crucial since the same action will have opposite interpretations (by
investors) depending on whether the action is taken within a low- or high- capital
equilibrium. Those beliefs are, however, not derived from first principles in the
paper and lack a behavioral pattern.
While similar in spirit, our corporate financing friction is casted within a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium framework. Moreover, we introduce a micro-founded
learning framework instead of beliefs. In this context, agents are rational insofar
that they (myopically) optimise and face cognitive limitations only on the variables
they do not directly control. Further, they are intrinsically rational insofar that
they choose their forecast rule based on an objectively defined criterion function
and they learn from the past. This is completely absent in the Bolton and Freixas
(2006) model. Lastly, our objective is to contribute to the discussion of whether a
market-based financing system or a bank-based one are more resilient to negative
shocks, are less prone to liquidity shortages and whether monetary transmission
is stronger in any of the systems. Hence, to provide clear-cut answers to those
questions, we focus on two extreme cases of the their framework: one where all
firms receive external finances from the market, and another where they receive it
from banks.4
2 Alternative sources of corporate finances
We introduce two types of corporate finance mechanisms. In the first version, mar-
kets provide loans to firms. However, due to asymmetric information (see Bernanke
4The focus of their paper is, on the other hand, on imperfect substitutatibility between external
finances and whether monetary policy can influence the preferences for one over the other.
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et al, 1999), firms need to collateralise internal funds as an insurance for creditors
in case of redirecting loans to unproductive activities, or in case the firm defaults.
Value of the collateral (or firm net worth) is determined by the stock market, a
market which is driven by imperfect beliefs and thus is prone to swings in market
sentiment. Via the standard Gordon discounted dividend model, the value of equity
depends on imperfect beliefs about the aggregate economy (output and inflation).
In addition, cost of loans charged by the market is also dependent on firm leverage,
with a positive relation between the two, since a higher leverage increases the risk
profile of the firm due to its higher exposure to market swings and negative shocks.
On the other hand, access to market funds is easy and flexible as long as beliefs about
the value of firm collateral are positive. Moreover, markets do not charge firms any
additional (or hidden) costs for supplying loans (such as operational costs or man-
agement fees). The foundations for this mechanism are described in De Grauwe and
Gerba (2015) or De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015).
In the second version, firms receive funds from banks. In other words, the de-
cision on how much to lend and at what price is entirely taken by the bank. The
decision depends basically on three factors: their market power in the retail branch,
the cost of managing bank capital in the wholesale branch, and the adjustment
costs in changing the lending rate by the retail branch. The second component is
moreover time-varying, which means that the capital level will fluctuate over the
business cycle.5This approach in modelling the financial sector follows Gerali et al
(2010) who model Euro Area financial sector and corporate financing in this way.
To sum up, firms like market-based financing because it is more flexible and,
conditional on positive market outlook, credit is relatively cheaper. Conversely, as
in Bolton and Freixas (2006), bank credit is attractive because it is more stable
and there is a lower probability of sharp reductions in supply during downturns
since banks interiorise the risks from heavy market downturns (using their capital
buffers). At the same time it is also more expensive because of capital adequacy-and
adjustment costs.
5We interiorise the entire credit granting decision to the bank in order to carefully study the
interaction between bank capital, credit production and monetary policy. The emphasis is thus
on the capital cost channel of banking. We do this in order to make a clear distinction to the
market valuation (or sentiment) channel in the other version. While there is a collateral constraint
included in the banking version, it is of second order importance. Hence firm leverage plays a
role for the lending rate to the extent that the higher the leverage, the lower a firm’s net worth
becomes, which reduces the firm’s possibility to negotiate a favourable loan with the retail branch
of the bank.
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Both mechanisms are embedded in an otherwise identical dynamic general equi-
librium structure of De Grauwe and Gerba (2015).
2.1 Market funding structure
To remind the reader about the corporate financing mechanism modelled in De
Grauwe and Gerba (2015) and De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) models, we will
just briefly outline it here.
Firms borrow money from the market paying an interest rate that normally
exceeds the risk-free interest rate. Hence the cost of market funds eftt is equal to
the risk free rate rt plus a spread xt as:
eftt = rt + xt (1)
The spread between the two rates depends on firms’ equity:
xt = eftt − rt = ψnft (2)
where ψ < 0. This is a parameter on firm equity and represents the share of
equity that cannot be used for borrowing. As the value goes down, more of firm
equity can be used as collateral for borrowing.6Following the financial accelerator
approach used in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), markets charge a premium
xt for the perceived credit risk from providing the funds. When the value of equity
rises, markets interpret this as an increase in a firm’s stake in the project, which
reduces firms’ incentives to invest money in unproductive projects or default. This
improves its solvency and the perceived credit risk falls. The exact opposite occurs
when the price of equity falls.7
In order to have asset price variability contribute to volatility in firms’ equity,
we connect firms’ market capitalization to the number of time-varying shares n¯t
multiplied by the current share price St, or:
6You can think of it as the financial innovation parameter. A more dynamic financial innovation
environment (or lower ψ) allows markets to extract a higher rate of firm equity in case the firm
defaults and allows firms to use more of it to borrow.
7In De Grauwe and Gerba (2015) and De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) banks provide loans
to firms. However these banks operate under zero profit and act as shadow lenders. In reality what
determines whether and what quantity firms can borrow is the value of their internal funds, or
equity. The price of equity is determined by the stock market. Hence, the stock market determines
if and how much firms can borrow. Therefore banks balance sheet is not necessary in this lending
mechanism and can be directly reduced to market-type of lending.
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nft = Stn¯t (3)
We use the standard Gordon discounted dividend model to derive share prices:
St =
Et[Λ¯t+1]
Rst
(4)
where;
Rst = rt + ξ (5)
with Et[ ¯Λt+1 denoting expected future dividends net of a discount rate R
s
t . The
rate consists of a risk-free component rt and a constant equity premium ξ. Hence
asset prices are determined by the expected dividend growth. In the stable growth
Gordon model, dividends grow at a constant rate. Moreover, agents assume that
the 1-period ahead forecast of dividends is a fraction f of nominal GDP one period
ahead.8Since nominal GDP consists of a real and inflation component and agents
have imperfect beliefs about both, they make a forecast about future (real) output-
and inflation gaps. These forecasts are re-evaluated in every period. Agents are
willing to switch to another forecasting rule if this performs better than the current
rule (we will describe this in further detail in section 2.4).
If agents forecast a positive output gap and/or inflation in the future, then via the
Gordon model, asset prices will also increase, relaxing firms’ borrowing constraint.
When all agents forecast a positive output/inflation gap (sentiment index=1), we
say that agents are optimists. When the index is zero, or all agents forecast a
negative output gap, agents become pessimistic. In that situation, asset prices will
fall, reducing the value of firm collateral and thus their borrowing capacity. In spirit
of De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), we call the fluctuations in agents’ forecasts
(or market sentiment) animal spirits.
Following the literature, a firm’s leverage ratio is defined as loans (Ldt ) over equity
(n¯tSt), or:
τt =
Ldt
n¯tSt
(6)
This leverage ratio is time-varying, and therefore endogenous to the business
cycle. Using the assumption in De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) that firms use
8Just as in De Grauwe and Gerba (2015), dividends are assumed to be constant thereafter.
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all external funds to invest, investment and loan demand are linked by:
it = L
d
t − Ldt−1 (7)
Combining equations 6 and 7, it becomes clear that firm net worth depends on
the inverse of firm leverage ratio (τt) according to:
nft =
1
τt
[Ldt−1 + it] (8)
In other words, the more a firms is leveraged, the stronger the amplification
effect of asset price movements on firm borrowing capacity. An increase in the value
of stock prices increases the value of collateral and reduces leverage. These two
components combined lead to a more than proportional increase in its borrowing
capacity. Conversely, when asset prices fall, the reduction in loans is more than
proportional. That is why we should expect sharp swings in firm finances over the
cycle as is typical of market-based corporate finance regimes.9
With this, we have linked the lending rate with the aggregate economy, via share
prices and the collateral constraint:
xt = ψtn
f
t ≡ ψn¯t
f [E˜tyt+1 + E˜tpit+1]
Rst
(9)
We have thus closed the link between imperfect beliefs, market financing and the
aggregate economy.
This mechanism is embedded into the broader behavioral model as in De Grauwe
and Gerba (2015). In it, interconnectedness between stock markets, firm finances
and the supply side give rise to important propagation of shocks and amplification
of market sentiments.
In the next subsection, we proceed with the second version of corporate financing
using banks as the (costly) loan supplier.
2.2 Financial sector
We introduce an imperfect bank-driven credit production, where banks take deposits
from savers, bundle these up into multiple credit lines, and give out loans to firms
at a cost determined by the intrinsic (loan) production technology. At the same
9Note that asset prices affect aggregate demand indirectly, via credit spread dynamics, and do
not have direct wealth effects as in De Grauwe (2012) or De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015).
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time, bank manages capital in a (dynamically) rational manner in order to cushion
against future shocks to its balance sheet. To facilitate the exposition, we separate
the bank capital management branch (wholesale sector) from the loan management
(retail sector) activity as in Gerali et al (2010).
We can think of the banks as composed of —textbftwo retail branches and one
wholesale branch. The first retail branch is responsible for giving out differentiated
loans to firms and the second for raising differentiated deposits. Banks operate in
a competitive environment in the wholesale sector, but behave monopolistically
competitive a la Dixit-Stiglitz in the retail one. Their ability to change rates in the
retail sector depends on the market power they hold in that segment (determined by
the parameters Bt and 
D
t for the loan and deposit segment) as well as the adjustment
costs.
2.2.1 Wholesale branch
The balance sheet of the commercial bank can be defined as:
Dt = pi
B
t n
B
t +Bt (10)
Dt are total deposits, Bt are total loans (given out to firms via the retail loan
branch), and piBt n
B
t is the real value of bank equity, where n
B
t is the number of stocks
of banks and piBt is the price.
10The capital-to-asset ratio of a bank (or the inverse
leverage) is thus:
κt =
piBt n
B
t
Bt
(11)
Whenever the bank deviates from the targeted capital-to-asset ratio ϑB, it pays
a quadratic cost proportional to the outstanding bank capital and governed by the
parameter κn
B
. This cost is internalized by the wholesale branch and carried over
to the retail branch and end borrower via:
RBt = R
D
t − κn
B
[κt − ϑB][κt]2 (12)
Assuming that banks have unlimited access to finance at the policy rate rt from
a central bank, via arbitrage condition we can rewrite the above expression as:
10The price of stocks is exogenously determined and normalized for the sake of simplicity.
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RBt − rt = −κn
B
[κt − ϑB][κt]2 (13)
We calibrate κn
B
to 11.07, or the median of the estimated value in Gerali et
al (2010), and ϑB to their calibrated value of 0.09 to maintain consistency. This
is a capital-to-asset ratio consistent with Basel II, and a generous leverage ratio of
approximately 11%.
The left-hand side of equation 13 captures marginal benefit from increasing lend-
ing since an increase in spread equals the increase in profits. Meanwhile, the right-
hand side represents the marginal cost from doing so in terms of the additional
expenses arising for moving away from the optimal capital-to-loan ratio. Whenever
the deviation from the target is positive (or bank has more capital than the target
value, i.e. the term in brackets is positive), the right hand side will be positive, and
so the spread will be smaller. Likewise, if deviation is negative, the right-hand side
in equation 13 will be positive, and to capture the higher costs, the spread between
the two rates will be larger.11In other words, as soon as the wholesale branch incurs
a capital (deviation) cost, they pass it on to the retail-lending branch (and end
borrowers). By symmetry, the same applies when they hold higher capital than the
required. However, since the borrowing rate cannot be lower than the policy rate,
this becomes the absolute floor. Taken together, banks will optimally choose a level
of loans where marginal benefits and costs are equalized.
2.2.2 Loan retail branch
It obtains wholesale loans Bt at rate R
B
t , differentiates them and resells them to
firms applying a mark-up. The mark-up is governed by a quadratic adjustment
cost for changing the rate over time, and the adjustment cost in turn depends on
the parameter determining the adjustment costs in loan rate setting, κB. These
are proportional to aggregate return on loans. The rate charged on loans can be
expressed as:
rBt =
1
Bt − 1 + (1 + β)κB
(κBrBt−1 + (
B
t − 1)RBt − Bt ) (14)
,which in absence of inertias can be reduced to:
11Moreover, banks have an incentive to increase their lending in order to increase their profits
(as they work under positive profit condition). This adds an additional (albeit softer) constraint
that banks will not have more capital than the required target value. If anything, they will try to
go beyond it and thus incur a cost.
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rBt = rt +
Bt
Bt − 1
(RBt − rt) +
1
Bt − 1
rt (15)
This is the external finance premium that firms are charged. The premium is
proportional to the wholesale branch spread, which in turn is determined by the
bank’s capital position. The degree of monopolistic competition also matters since
an increase in market power (a fall in Bt ) results in a higher premium.
Following Gerali et al (2010) and Bene and Lees (2007), we assume that the
contracts that firms use to obtain loans are a composite constant elasticity of substi-
tution basket of slightly differentiated financial products - each supplied by a branch
of a bank j - and with elasticity Bt , as in Dixit and Stieglitz framework.
12The elas-
ticity is stochastic and exogenously determined. These innovations to elasticity can
be seen as alterations independent from the monetary policy. Assuming symmetry
amongst firms, their aggregate demand for loans at bank j can be expressed as:13
bt(j) =
rBt (j)
rBt
−B
bt (16)
To interpret this expression, the loan that firm i gets depends on the overall
volume of loans given to all firms, and on the interest rate charged on loans by bank
j relative to the rate index for loans with similar characteristics.
2.2.3 Deposit retail branch
In an analogous way, the retail unit collect deposits from savers and passes the funds
on to the wholesale branch. They remunerate these funds at rate rt. The quadratic
adjustment costs for changing the deposit rate are determined by the parameter
determining adjustment costs in deposit rate setting, κD, and are proportional to
aggregate interest paid on deposits. Analogous to the retail-borrowing rate, the
deposit rate can be described as:
rDt =
1
Dt − 1 + (1 + β)κD
(κDrDt−1 + (
D
t − 1)RDt − Dt ) (17)
,which in absence of inertias, is simply a markdown over the policy rate:
12The loan elasticity Bt is assumed to be above 1.
13In Gerali et al (2010) this expression is derived after minimizing over all firms
Bt(i, j) the total repayment due to the continuum of banks j,
∫ 1
0
rBt (j)bt(i, j)dj, subject to
[
∫ 1
0
bt(i, j)
(Bt −1)/(Bt )dj]
B
t /(
B
t −1) ≥ bt(i). (Bt − 1)/(Bt ) is the marku-p that banks apply on loans.
Here we just take the derived first-order-condition and aggregate amongst firms. The micro-
foundations are, however, straight forward.
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rDt =
Dt
Dt − 1
rt (18)
The demand for deposits of saver i is symmetrically obtained to the case of
loan rate determination in the previous subsection. Once again we assume that
the contracts that savers use to deposit money are a composite constant elasticity
of substitution basket of slightly differentiated financial products - each supplied
by a branch of a bank j - and with elasticity Dt .
14The elasticity is stochastic and
exogenously determined. Once again, these innovations to elasticity can be seen as
alterations independent from the monetary policy. Assuming symmetry amongst
savers, their aggregate demand for deposits at bank j can by analogy to the above
case be expressed as:15
dt(j) =
rDt (j)
rDt
−D
dt (19)
,where dt are the aggregate deposits in the economy, r
D
t (j) is the return on
deposits from bank j, and rDt is the rate index for that kind of deposits.
2.2.4 Bank finances
Now that we have described the dynamics of each of the branches, we are in a
position to describe the finances of the aggregate bank unit. Overall bank profits
(pB) are the sum of net earnings from the two retail (rBt bt−rDt dt) and one wholesale
branch (κ
B
2
[
piBt n
B
t
Bt
− ϑB]2piBt nBt − AdjBt ):
pBt = r
B
t bt − rDt dt −
κB
2
[
piBt n
B
t
Bt
− ϑB]2piBt nBt − AdjBt (20)
Each period profits are accumulated in a standard fashion, and added onto ex-
isting bank equity stock according to:
piBt n
B
t = (1− δB)piBt−1nBt−1 + pBt−1 (21)
Banks’ equity position has a core role in the functioning of the financial system
14The deposit elasticity Dt is assumed to be below -1.
15In Gerali et al (2010) this expression is derived after minimizing over all savers
Dt(i, j) the total repayment due to the continuum of banks j,
∫ 1
0
rDt (j)dt(i, j)dj, subject to
[
∫ 1
0
dt(i, j)
(Dt −1)/(Dt )dj]
D
t /(
D
t −1) ≤ dt(i). (Dt − 1)/(Dt ) is the mark-up that banks apply on
deposits. Here we just take the derived first-order-condition and aggregate amongst savers. The
micro-foundations are, however, direct.
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since it (simultaneously) determines the quantity and the price of loans supplied. On
one hand, it determines the external finance premium of firms. On the other, since
banks pay a cost whenever they deviate from their targeted capital-to-asset ratio
ϑB, banks will choose a level of loans where the marginal benefit from extending the
credit portfolio equals the marginal costs for deviating from the ϑB target.
2.3 Aggregate dynamics
For the MBF model, we keep the equations as in the benchmark De Grauwe and
Gerba (2015) model. In that framework, the aggregate demand equation can be
expressed as:
yt = a1E˜tyt+1+(1−a1)yt−1+a2(rt−E˜tpit+1)+(a2+a3)xt+(a1−a2)ψ(ut)kt+Adjt+t; (a1−a2) > 0
(22)
Notice that apart from the standard terms derived in De Grauwe(2011, 2012)
and De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), aggregate demand depends on the usable
capital in the production, utkt discounted for the cost of financing (xt).
The reader will also notice that aggregate demand depends on the external fi-
nance (or risk) premium xt. This is a reduced form expression for investment, since
investment is governed directly by this premium, and therefore it is the dependent
variable (see DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) for a derivation of this term).
In the case of BBF, we will need to make some amendments to the above ex-
pression.
First, we use expression 14 to redefine the external finance premium in I.1, and
get:
yt = a1E˜tyt+1+(1−a1)yt−1+a2′a3′(rt−E˜tpit+1)+a4‘RBt +(a1−a2)ψ(ut)kt+Adjt+t
(23)
,where a2′ =
Bt (d3+e2)
1−d1 , a3′ =
1
Bt −1+(1+β)κB
and a4′ = (
B − 1). Hence we have
redefined the external finance premium xt in the aggregate demand equation. Sec-
ond, banks accumulate capital and this is added to the resource constraint above.
Following Gerali et al (2010) we add the net bank equity (net of equity depreciation
rate δB) to the above expression:
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yt = a1E˜tyt+1+(1−a1)yt−1+a2′a3′(rt−E˜tpit+1)+a4‘RBt +(a1−a2)ψ(ut)kt+δBpiBt−1nBt−1+Adjt+t
(24)
Third, we include the adjustment costs from changing the (deposit and lending)
rates into the term Adjt.
As is standard, the aggregate supply (AS) equation is obtained from the price
discrimination problem of retailers (monopolistically competitive):
pit = b1E˜tpit+1 + (1− b1)pit−1 + b2yt + νt (25)
As explained in DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), b1 = 1 corresponds to the
New-Keynesian version of AS with Calvo-pricing (Woodford, 2003).
To complete the model, we will briefly outline the learning dynamics that we
make use of in this framework.
2.4 Expectations formation and learning
Under rational expectations, the expectational term will equal its realized value
in the next period, i.e. EtXt+1 = Xt+1, denoting generically by Xt any variable
in the model. However, as anticipated above, we depart from this assumption in
this framework by considering bounded rationality as in DeGrauwe (2011, 2012).
Expectations are replaced by a convex combination of heterogeneous expectation
operators Etyt+1 = E˜tyt+1 and Etpit+1 = E˜tpit+1. In particular, agents forecast
output and inflation using two alternative forecasting rules: fundamentalist rule vs.
extrapolative rule. Under the fundamentalist rule, agents are assumed to use the
steady-state value of the output gap - y∗, here normalized to zero against a naive
forecast based on the gap’s latest available observation (extrapolative rule). Equally
for inflation, fundamentalist agents are assumed to base their expectations on the
central bank’s target - pi∗ against the extrapolatists who naively base their forecast on
a random walk approach.16We can formally express the fundamentalists in inflation
and output forecasting as:
E˜ft pit+1 = pi
∗ (26)
16The latest available observation is the best forecast of the future.
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E˜ft yt+1 = y∗ (27)
and the extrapolists in both cases as:
E˜et pit+1 = θpit−1 (28)
E˜et yt+1 = θyt−1 (29)
This particular form of adaptive expectations has previously been modelled by
Pesaran (1987), and Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), amongst others, in the liter-
ature. Setting θ = 1 captures the ”naive” agents (as they have a strong belief in
history dependence), while a θ < 1 or θ > 1 represents an ”adaptive” or an ”extrap-
olative” agent (Brock and Hommes, 1998). For reasons of tractability, we set θ = 1
in this model.
Note that for the sake of consistency with the DSGE model, all variables here
are expressed in gaps. Focusing on their cyclical component makes the model sym-
metric with respect to the steady state (see Harvey and Jaeger, 1993). Therefore, as
DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) show, it is not necessary to include a zero lower
bound constraint in the model since a negative interest rate should be understood
as a negative interest rate gap. In general terms, the equilibrium forecast/target for
each variable will be equal to its’ steady state value.
Next, selection of the forecasting rule depends on the (historical) performance of
the various rules given by a publically available goodness-of-fit measure, the mean
square forecasting error (MSFE). After the time ‘t’ realization is revealed, the two
predictors are evaluated ex post using MSFE and new fractions of agent types are
determined. These updated fractions are used to determine the next period (ag-
gregate) forecasts of output-and inflation gaps, and so on. Agents’ rationality con-
sists therefore in choosing the best-performing predictor using the updated fitness
measure. There is a strong empirical motivation for inserting this type of switch-
ing mechanism amongst different forecasting rules (see DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli
(2015) for a brief discussion of the empirical literature, Frankel and Froot (1990)
for a discussion of fundamentalist behaviour, and Roos and Schmidt (2012), Cogley
(2002), Cogley and Sargent (2007) and Cornea, Hommes and Massaro (2013) for
evidence of extrapolative behaviour, in particular for inflation forecasts).
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The aggregate market forecasts of output gap and inflation is obtained as a
weighted average of each rule:
E˜tpit+1 = α
f
t E˜
f
t pit+1 + α
e
t E˜
e
t pit+1 (30)
E˜tyt+1 = α
f
t E˜
f
t yt+1 + α
e
t E˜
e
t yt+1 (31)
where αft is the weighted average of fundamentalists, and α
e
t that of the ex-
trapolists. These shares are time-varying and based on the dynamic predictor se-
lection. The mechanism allows to switch between the two forecasting rules based
on MSFE / utility of the two rules, and increase (decrease) the weight of one rule
over the other at each t. Assuming that the utilities of the two alternative rules
have a deterministic and a random component (with a log-normal distribution as
in Manski and McFadden (1981) or Anderson et al (1992)), the two weights can
be defined based on each period utility for each forecast Uxi,t, i = (y, pi), x = (f, e)
according to:
αfpi,t =
exp(γU fpi,t)
exp(γU fpi,t) + exp(γU
e
pi,t)
(32)
αfy,t =
exp(γU fy,t)
exp(γU fy,t) + exp(γU
e
y,t)
(33)
αepi,t ≡ 1− αfpi,t =
exp(γU epi,t)
exp(γU fpi,t) + exp(γU
e
pi,t)
(34)
αey,t ≡ 1− αfy,t =
exp(γU ey,t)
exp(γU fy,t) + exp(γU
e
y,t)
(35)
,where the utilities are defined as:
U fpi,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[pit−k−1 − E˜ft−k−2pit−k−1]2 (36)
U fy,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[yt−k−1 − E˜ft−k−2yt−k−1]2 (37)
U epi,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[pit−k−1 − E˜et−k−2pit−k−1]2 (38)
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U ey,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[yt−k−1 − E˜et−k−2yt−k−1]2 (39)
and wk = (ρ
k(1 − ρ)) (with 0 < ρ < 1) are geometrically declining weights
adapted to include the degree of forgetfulness in the model (DeGrauwe, 2012). γ is
a parameter measuring the extent to which the deterministic component of utility
determines actual choice. A value of 0 implies a perfectly stochastic utility. In that
case, agents decide to be one type or the other simply by tossing a coin, implying a
probability of each type equalizing to 0.5. On the other hand, γ =∞ implies a fully
deterministic utility, and the probability of using the fundamentalist (extrapolative)
rule is either 1 or 0. Another way of interpreting γ is in terms of learning from past
performance: γ = 0 imples zero willingness to learn, while it increases with the size
of the parameter, i.e. 0 < γ <∞.
As mentioned above, agents will subject the performance of rules to a fit mea-
sure and choose the one that performs best. In that sense, agents are ’boundedly’
rational and learn from their mistakes. More importantly, this discrete choice mech-
anism allows to endogenize the distribution of heterogeneous agents over time with
the proportion of each agent using a certain rule (parameter α). The approach is
consistent with the empirical studies (Cornea et al, 2012) who show that the dis-
tribution of heterogeneous agents varies in reaction to economic volatility (Carroll
(2003), Mankiw et al (2004)).
2.5 Calibration and model solution
2.5.1 Calibration
To simplify and focus the discussion, we will only present the calibrations of the
parameters that are new to this model. The remaining parameters, including the
parameters specific to the MBF version of this paper, have the same values as in De
Grauwe and Gerba (2015). We refer to that paper for a more detailed discussion,
as well as to the parameter list in the Appendix.
The parameters specific to the banking sector and the loan-deposit production
are parametrized to the values in Gerali et al (2010). This is because their model
attempts to replicate the banking sector frictions present in the Euro Area, which
is also our interest here. The parameters that are calibrated in their model have
the same values in our BBF version. So, for instance, banks’ capital-to-asset target
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ratio, ς is set to 0.09 in order to reflect a low-and-stable leverage in the banking
sector (which is optimal from the perspective of the macroprudential authority).
Also, banks’ market power in the loan-and deposit-rate setting (b and d) are set
to 3.12 and -1.46 in order to reflect the relative strength that banks have in assets
with respect to their liabilities. Equally, banks’ cost for managing its capital is
parametrized to 0.1049 as in Gerali et al (2010) in order to induce a sufficiently high
cost for banks for reducing its capital position. The intertemporal discount rate, β is
standardly set to 0.9943. The initial bank capital n¯b is set to 1, which is sufficiently
low in order to allow banks to operate in the initial period.
The parameters that were estimated in Gerali et al (2010) have been set in accor-
dance to the results from their posterior distributions. In this way, the adjustment
costs in leverage deviation, firms’ rate, and household rate (or κnb, κb, and κd) were
calibrated to 11.07, 13 and 3.50 that is well within the 95% interval of the posterior.
Moreover, those costs correctly reflect the varying costs that banks face in managing
bank equity, producing loans and offering deposits.
All shocks, except to the capital utilization, are parametrized as white noise
which means that their autoregressive component is set to 0. Likewise the standard
deviations of shocks are set to 0.5 across the entire spectrum.17
2.5.2 Model solution
We solve the model using recursive methods (see DeGrauwe (2012) for further de-
tails). This allows for non-linear effects. The model has six endogenous variables,
output gap, inflation, financing spread, savings, capital and interest rate. In the
benchmark MBF version of the model, the first five are obtained after solving the
following system:

1 −b2 0 0 0
−a2c1 1− a2c2 −(a2 + a3) 0 (a1 − a2)ψ(ut)
−ψτ−1e2c1 −ψτ−1e2c1 (1− ψτ−1e2) 0 0
d3c1 −(1− d1 − d3c2) 0 1 0
0 0 e2 0 1


pit
yt
xt
st
kt

=
17The AR-component of the shock to capital utilization cost is set conservatively to 0.1, just
enough to generate some persistence in the capital cost structure.
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=
b1 0 0 0 −e2
−a2 1− a1 0 0 Ψ( itit−1 )e1
−ψτ−1e2 −ψτ−1e2 0 0 0
d3 −d2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0


E˜t[pit+1]
E˜t[yt+1]
E˜t[xt+1]
E˜t[st+1]
E˜t[kt+1]

+
+

1− b2 0 0 0 0
0 1− a′1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 −(1− d1 − d2) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 (1− δψ(ut))


pit−1
yt−1
xt−1
st−1
kt−1

+
+

0 0 0
a2c3 0 0
−ψτ−1e2c3 ψτ−1 ψτ−1
d2c3 0 0
e2 0 0


rt−1
Dt−1
nbt−1
+

1 0 0 0 0
0 a2 0 1 (a1 − a2)
0 ψ−1τe2 1 0 0
0 −d3 0 −(1− d1) 0
0 0 0 0 1


ηt
ut
ϑ
t
ucft

In the BBF version, the system of equations for the five variables looks instead
like:

1 −b2 0 0 0
−a2c1 1− a2c2 −(a2 + a3) 0 (a1 − a2)ψ(ut)
− κb∗e2∗c1
b−1+(1+β)κb − κ
b∗e2∗c1
b−1+(1+β)κb − κ
b∗e2
b−1+(1+β)κb 0 0
d3c1 −(1− d1 − d3c2) 0 1 0
0 0 e2 0 1


pit
yt
xt
st
kt

=
=

b1 0 0 0 −e2
−a2 1− a1 0 0 Ψ( itit−1 )e1
−e2∗c1
b−1+(1+β)κb
e1
b−1+(1+β)κb 0 0 0
d3 −d2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0


E˜t[pit+1]
E˜t[yt+1]
E˜t[xt+1]
E˜t[st+1]
E˜t[kt+1]

+
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+
1− b2 0 0 0 0
0 1− a′1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 −(1− d1 − d2) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 (1− δ)


pit−1
yt−1
xt−1
st−1
kt−1

+
+

0 0 0
a2c3 0 0
(b−1)∗e2∗c3
b−1+(1+β)κb
(b−1)
b−1+(1+β)κb∗(1−κ)
(b−1)∗e2∗c3
b−1+(1+β)κb
d3c3 0 0
e2 0 0


rt−1
Dt−1
nbt−1
+
+

1 0 0 0
0 a2 1 (a1 − a2)
0 (ς − ςt−1) ∗ e2 0 0
0 −d3 −(1− d1) 0
0 0 0 1


ηt
ut
t
ucft

Using matrix notation, we can write this as: AZt = BE˜tZt+1 + CZt−1 + DXt−1 + Evt.
We can solve forZt by inverting: Zt = A
−1(BE˜tZt+1 + CZt−1 + DXt−1 + Evt)
and assuring A to be non-singular.
The only difference is that the equation for financing spread (line 3 in matrices
A, B D and E) looks different in the two versions of the model (since the spread
depends on different variables respectively).
Solution for interest rate rt is obtained by substituting yt and pit into the Taylor
rule. Bank equities, credit, deposits, loan rate, deposit rate, bank profits, bank
leverage, firm leverage, investment, utilization costs, labor, net worth of banks, and
net worth of firms are determined by the model solutions for output gap, inflation,
financing spread, savings and capital.18
Expectation terms with a tilde E˜t implies that we do not impose rational ex-
pectations. Using the system of equations above, if we substitute the law of motion
consistent with heterogeneity of agents (fundamentalists and extrapolators), then
we can show that the endogenous variables depend linearly on lagged endogenous
18However, external financing spread, capital, and savings do not need to be forecasted as these
do not affect the dynamics of the model (i.e. there is no structure of higher order beliefs as law
of iterated expectations does not hold in the behavioral model). See section 3.1 in DeGrauwe and
Macchiarelli (2015) for comparison of solutions under rational expectations and bounded rationality
(”heuristics”).
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variables, their equilibrium forecasts and current exogenous shocks.
Note that for the forecasts of output and inflation gap, the forward looking
terms in equations I.1 and I.7 are substituted by the discrete choice mechanism in
I.26. For a comparison of solutions in the ’bounded rationality’ model and rational
expectations framework, see section 2.4 in De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015).
2.5.3 Forcing variables
The shock we will examine in this paper is a conventional (expansionary) monetary
policy shock ():19
rt = rt−1 + γpit + (1− γ)yt +  (40)
,where  is a white noise monetary policy shock which is calibrated to 0.5 in both
versions of the model. This shock is not persistent, so we set the AR(1) process to
0. Alternatively, we could have set the AR parameter to somewhere between 08
and 0.95, as is standard in the traditional DSGE literature. However, we wish to
maintain consistency and facilitate comparability with previous behavioral models,
and therefore choose a white noise shock.
Note in matrix E that the monetary policy shock is scaled by the leverage gap
in the banking sector (ς − ςt). This gap measures how much the banking sector is
away from its’ targeted (or optimal) leverage ratio. The bigger the gap, the more
leveraged the banking sector, and the stronger effect a monetary policy shock will
have on the system. This is in order to capture the enhanced effects that leveraging
has on flows, in particular when a de-leveraging spiral is triggered.20
19In an extension, we also introduce other three shocks (technology, aggregate demand and
capital utilization cost shocks) but here prefer to focus on the monetary transmission channel only.
For the analysis of the other shocks, please refer to De Grauwe and Gerba (2015).
20Before we begin with the analysis, bear in mind that the behavioral model does not have one
steady state that is time invariant for the same calibration (as is standard for the DSGE method).
Therefore, following a white noise shock, the model will not necessarily return to a previous steady
state. If not the same steady state, it can either reach a new steady state, or have a prolonged
response to the initial shock. In other words, there is a possibility for the temporary shock to
have permanent effects in the model (via the animal spirits channel). That is why we draw a full
distribution of impulse responses to capture the entire spectrum of responses.
23
3 Quantitative results
We divide our analysis in three parts. First, we will briefly discuss the impulse
responses and compare the monetary transmission channels to the real economy be-
tween the two versions. Next, we will use the statistical moments (of the models and
data) and ergodic distributions to analyse the role imperfect beliefs play in driving
business and financial cycles and compare business cycles across the two models.
The final part is a conditional exercise where our aim is to examine the effectiveness
of (conventional) monetary policy in taking the economy out of a contraction and
generate boom conditional on the economy already being in a bust.
Bear in kind that our ultimate interest lies in understanding how financial fric-
tions in corporate financing influence the effectiveness of monetary policy. Therefore,
except the financial friction, everything else is equal across the two models, includ-
ing imperfect beliefs, learning dynamics, the remaining characteristics of the firm
sector, the rest of the economy, and the type and size of shock.
3.1 Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
Figure II.1 depicts the impulse responses to an expansionary monetary policy shock
in the MBF version, whereas Figures II.2 and II.3 depict the responses to the same
shock in the BBF version. We have included the responses of a large number of model
variables including output, investment, capital, inflation, interest rate, deposits,
loans, animal spirits, bank profits (BBF), bank equity (BBF), bank leverage (BBF),
and deposit rate (BBF). The numbers on the x-axis indicate number of quarters.
The shock is introduced in t=100 and we observe the responses over a long period
of 60 quarters (or 15 years). The figures depict the full impulse responses with the
95% confidence intervals. The blue line represents the median impulse response,
and the red lines are the 95% interval.
Examining the median responses in the MBF model in Figure II.1, a drop in
policy interest rate (0.5% fall) leads to a fall in the external finance premium, which
relaxes the credit that firms can access and therefore pushes up investment (0.3%).
This pushes up capital accumulation (0.4%). This initial expansion is by the market
perceived as a period of positive outlook, which triggers an optimistic phase (animal
spirits up 0.2%). This optimism coupled with the drop in the (benchmark) interest
rate results in a noticeable increase in loans to firms (1.1% and statistically signif-
icant). Roughly, that is twice the size of the initial drop in interest rate. There
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are three channels at play. First, the reduction in policy rate reduces the lending
benchmark rate and increases liquidity on the market, pushing the external finance
premium down. At the same time, the discount factor in the Gordon dividend model
falls, which increases the share price and the value of collateral, and reduces further
the external finance premium. On top of that, optimism (which is reflected in the
positive forecast of future output and inflation gaps) pushes the share prices up,
increases the value of collateral and contracts the external finance premium.21
Turning to the BBF version in Figures II.2 and II.3, the effects from a monetary
policy expansion are, on average, twice as large. Investment rises by 0.7%, capital
by 0,4% and animal spirits by 0.1%. On the financial side, banks expand their
lending and leverage. On the deposit side, the rate goes up by 0.5%, attracting more
deposits (0.2%). This permits banks to increase loans by 0.75%. The consequence is
an increase in leverage by 0.1% many periods ahead, but also a substantial increase
in bank profitability, since they rise over a long period.
On the real side, output increases by 0.4% and inflation by 0.08%. Meanwhile,
in the MBF version, the expansion is more moderate at 0.20% for output and 0.01%
for inflation, with a lag of 1 quarter.22
The confidence intervals are also much narrower in the BBF version. Since firm
leverage plays a less central role in the intermediation mechanism of the bank-based
model version, market sentiments (or the uncertainty arising from imperfect beliefs
on the stock market) in equation 9 are not translated to the model dynamics to the
same extent. As a result, the variation around the median impulse response is much
smaller, and the IRF distribution is tighter.
A boom in credit caused by a monetary expansion is stronger in a market-based
system. The interaction between the actual drop in interest rate with positive
market outlook relaxes the credit constraint more than proportionally. While the
credit expansion is significant in the bank-based system, it is somewhat smaller. This
is because banks need to sustain costly capital requirements and shield it against
future negative outlooks. However, the impulse response estimates in the MBF
version are much wider which implies that there is a non-negligible probability of
21However, this optimism is very brief as the monetary authority raises the interest rate (0.1%)
to combat the rising inflation. The market perceives this as the end of the expansionary phase,
resulting in a reversal of the sentiment to pessimism (animal spirits fall by 0.05%). The consequence
is a turn in the response of macroeconomic and financial aggregates, leading to return of these
variables to the steady state.
22Initially, output falls by 0.25% as well as inflation by 0.05%, but this is reverted after 1 period.
This finding is frequent in the literature and denominated as the price puzzle.
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the credit expansion being smaller than in the BBF version. It mainly depends on
the strength of the initial animal spirit channel.
The macroeconomic effects from this expansion, on the other hand, are stronger
in the bank-based version. This is because less of the market uncertainty is passed
through to the real economy, which allows it to expand more. That is why investment
rises by more than twofold in the BBF version. In some sense, the marginal benefit
in terms of generating aggregate growth of a unit of credit is higher in a bank-based
financing system.
3.2 Business-and financial cycles
We simulate the model for 2000 periods (or 500 years), calculate the statistical
moments for all the variables and their respective ergodic distributions and compare
these to the US data. Table II.2 reports the correlations in the two models and the
data. Table II.3 compare volatilities, Table II.4 skewness, and Table II.5 kurtosis
between the models and the data.
Both models are capable of generating smaller cyclical fluctuations, as well as
larger booms and busts. When the amplitude of the cycle is small, the financial
expansion is also more limited. However, following a longer expansion, the busts are
also heavier as depicted in the first two graphs of Figure II.4. The heavy contrac-
tions extend to all variables including the standard ones such as inflation, capital,
and asset prices, but also financials such as net worth and the external finance pre-
mium. But in addition, the cycles are asymmetric around the zero-line. This means
that following a long expansion, the drop in most variables is deeper than the pre-
vious rise. Compared to rational expectations models, this is possible to generate
because of the additional uncertainty (or friction) originating from imperfect be-
liefs. Following a negative shock (to, for instance, investment or technology), the
usual contraction in output due to lower production-investment-purchase schedule
is present. Moreover, less capital is purchased from capital goods producers, which
reduces future net worth and therefore external finance possibilities. On top of that
and because of imperfect forecasts regarding future productivity, a sequence of neg-
ative state variable realizations will depress the outlook of market. These negative
beliefs work as accelerator of the (fundamental) shocks, and mixed with financial
frictions, result in sharp drops.
The Jacques-Bera tests in Table II.6, a visual inspection of the (ergodic) dis-
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tributions in Figures II.7 and II.8 and the moments in Tables II.3 to II.5 confirm
this. In both models, the null hypothesis of normality is rejected for (almost) all
variables. A closer inspection of the skewness results in Table II.4 show that most
variables are skewed (left or right) and many have a high kurtosis in Table II.5.
However, both the Jacques-Bera test staistics and the moments suggest a (rel-
atively) lower degree of non-Normality (or asymmetry and extreme values) in the
BBF model. The only exceptions are asset prices, loan supply, net worth of banks,
and net worth of firms. Combining this with the visual inspection in Figures II.4
to II.6, this means that even if the BBF model generates greater fluctuations in
the credit variables, due to the additional level of financial frictions in banking, the
pass-through to the real economy is smoother. Banks absorb some of that volatility
using their capital buffers. In the MBF version, on the other hand, that volatility is
directly passed on to borrowers, who include them in their intertemporal decision-
making. That is why we see a higher degree of skewness and fatter tails in the
aggregate economy in the MBF version.
Turning to data, note in Tables II.4 and II.5 that almost all variables in the
US sample are skewed and kurtic.23Their distributions are non-normal. Capturing
these asymmetries is important in any model that tries to replicate the US economy.
Evaluating the tables, for many of the variables, the BBF model does a better job.
Likewise for second moments. For instance, in Table II.2 the autocorrelations of yt,
kt, pit and xt are improved with respect to the market-based version. The correlations
of financial market variables are also considerably improved.
3.3 Monetary stimulus in recessions: When is it more ef-
fective?
The final part concerns the responsiveness and effectiveness of monetary policy con-
ditional on a recession. This is different from the overall effectiveness we studied in
the impulse response analysis, as we condition the economy to be in a recession by
simulating the model for 2000 periods and extract those when the economy is in a
recession. During those periods, we examine by how much and how frequently the
interest rate drops and the effect these drops have on the subsequent path of the
other variables. Remember that the basic models include only one shock. Therefore
we can clearly identify the exogenous processes that drive the underlying model dy-
23Except maybe consumption.
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namics in the simulations. Since 2000 periods is a long sample, we zoom in 100 of
those in Figures II.4 to II.6 and study this conditional dynamics.
Earlier we mentioned that the cyclical swings in output are heavier in the MBF
version. Yet from the last row of graphs in Figure II.4 monetary policy is more
accommodative in recessions in the BBF model. Both the total number of interest
rate drops and the depth, on average, of each is higher. The sharpest drop of more
than 5% around t=340, for instance, does not at all occur in the MBF model. On
the contrary, the hikes in interest rates are instead sharper in the MBF version.
The total effect on output from these interest rate cuts is nonetheless more
modest. Taking into account that output expansions are weaker in BBF (by up to
1/3 compared to MBF), the more accommodative monetary policy in this version
does not equally translate into heavy booms. The reason, we believe, is the capital
restrictions that banks face in downturns (since it is highly probable that their
capital-to-loan ratio falls) that does not allow them to fully make use of the new
liquidity to extend lending in the same proportion. Equally, the emerging positive
market outlook will improve firm’s capital position, but not as quickly as in the MBF
version (due to more restricted credit), which in turn will moderate the self-fulfilling
effects on market sentiment, and thus growth.
Yet, in the context of the Great Recession and consumption smoothing, the role
of interest rate in smoothing the cycles of output has become equally (if not more)
important. If the aim of the monetary policy is to smoothen the business cycle (via
expected inflation), then this objective is fulfilled to a greater extent in the BBF
version. The volatility of the business cycle is more than 10% less than that of
the MBF version. Hence monetary policy in the BBF version is more successful in
achieving economic stability.
4 Discussion and concluding remarks
The effectiveness of monetary policy in reviving stagnating economies has once again
become a key priority for policy makers in advanced and emerging economies during
the Great Recession. The extent to which monetary easing can restore confidence
on financial markets as well as reinstate economic growth has been a key priority
for the Fed, ECB, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, and more recently for central
banks in BRICS countries. Their success in achieving those objectives, however, is
still very unclear.
28
We look at one aspect of this problematic in the current paper. We examine
the relative effectiveness of monetary policy in a bank-based and in a market-based
(corporate) financing system. Our aim is to understand whether the monetary trans-
mission mechanism is more effective when banks or markets provide the majority of
liquidity in the economy. Bank credit is preferred because it is more stable. On the
other hand, the benefits from market loans are that they are flexible and more of it
is available in upturns.
In the impulse response analysis, we find that a credit boom caused by a mon-
etary expansion is stronger in a market-based system. The interaction between the
actual drop in interest rate with positive market outlook relaxes the credit constraint
more than proportionally. That said, the impulse response estimates in the MBF
version are much wider which implies that there is a non-negligible probability of
the credit expansion being smaller than in the BBF version. It mainly depends on
the strength of the initial animal spirit channel.
The macroeconomic effects from this expansion, on the other hand, are stronger
in the bank-based version. This is because less of the market uncertainty is passed
through to the real economy, which allows it to expand more. In some sense, the
marginal benefit of a unit of credit is higher in a bank-based financing system.
To conclude, we evaluate the effect of monetary expansions conditional on the
economy being in a recession. While interest rate cuts are more frequent and larger
in the BBF model, the total effect on output is more modest. Capital restrictions
and the limited influence of market sentiment in loan supply decisions limit the full-
fledged expansionary effects from interest rate cuts compared to the MBF model.
Then again, if the aim of monetary policy is to reduce the volatility in the economy
(for financial or consumption smoothing purposes), then a monetary policy in the
BBF model accomplishes this objective in a more effective way.
Yet, in the context of the Great Recession and consumption smoothing, the role
of interest rate in smoothing the cycles of output has become equally (if not more)
important. If the aim of the monetary policy is to smoothen the business cycle (via
expected inflation), then this objective is fulfilled to a greater extent in the BBF
version. The volatility of the business cycle is more than 10% less than that of
the MBF version. Hence monetary policy in the BBF version is more successful in
achieving economic stability.
There are several ways in which the current work can be extended. First, the
framework can be extended to an open-economy setting. Considering that global
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trade has increased the degree of openness of many economies, the interaction be-
tween monetary policy and the external sector is an important mechanism. This
is ignored in the current paper, and therefore the sensitivity of monetary policy to
external shocks is completely overlooked.
Second and possibly more interesting would be to include a mixture model of
financing in our framework. Instead of studying separately a pure bank based and
market-based system, a more realistic approach is to include both but with different
weights depending on the economy at study. That would bring this framework
closer to the one of Bolton and Freixas (2006), but again different to theirs, allow
us to additionally study the important interaction between imperfect beliefs and
the financial system. It would also represent a more general version of the current
theoretical set-up.
Lastly, we calibrate our parameters in the model. An interesting exercise would
be to estimate the parameters of the model in order to get a more accurate repre-
sentation of the business cycles.
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Appendices
I Equations in the MBF and BBF models
Aggregate Demand:
Aggregate Demand:
yt = a1E˜tyt+1+(1−a1)yt−1+a2(rt−E˜tpit+1)+(a2+a3)efpt+(a1−a2)ψ(ut)kt+Adjt+t
(I.1)
Investment
it = e1E˜t[yt+1] + e2[rt + efpt − E˜t[pit+1]] (I.2)
External Finance Premium
efpt = φn¯tSt (I.3)
Consumption
ct = 1− st (I.4)
Aggregate Supply:
Cobb-Douglas Production Function
yt = at(ktψ(ut))
αhωt
1−α (I.5)
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Utilization cost function
ψ(ut) = ξ0 + ξ1(ut − 1) + ξ2
2
(ut − 1)2 (I.6)
Approximated Philips Curve:
pit = b1E˜tpit+1 + (1− b1)pit−1 + b2yt + νt (I.7)
Capital evolution
kt = (1− δ)ψ(ut)kt−1 + Ψit (I.8)
Cash-in-advance constraint
ϑt = St+1kt+1 − nft (I.9)
Labour market
yt =
ltwt
1− α (I.10)
Monetary policy
rnt = ρr
n
t−1 + ζpit + γyyt + σr (I.11)
Financial market:
Bank net worth
nbt = κ(l
s
t + n¯St) (I.12)
Evolution of bank leverage
τt = τt−1 +
ldt
nft
(I.13)
Stock market price
St =
Et[ ¯Λt+1]
Rst
≡ f [E˜tyt+1 + E˜tpit+1]
Rst
(I.14)
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Firm net worth
nft = Stn¯t =
1
τ
(LDt−1 + e1E˜tyt+1 + e2(rt + efpt − E˜tpit+1)) (I.15)
Deposits
dt = dt−1 + st (I.16)
Loan demand
ldt = l
d
t−1 + it (I.17)
Credit market equilibrium
ldt = l
s
t (I.18)
Bank-based financing system:
rbt =
κbrbt + (
b − 1)Rbt − b
b − 1 + (1 + β)κb (I.19)
rdt =
κdrdt − (d − 1)Rdt + d
−d + 1− (1 + β)κd (I.20)
xt ≡ rbt − rdt = rbt − rt (I.21)
Rbt = rt − κnb[
nbt
lst
− ς][n
b
t
lst
]2 (I.22)
ςt = ς − [ l
s
t
nbt
] (I.23)
pibt = r
b
t l
s
t − rdt dt −
κnb
2
[
nbt
lst
− ς]2nbt − adjt (I.24)
nbt = n¯
b + (1− δb)nbt−1 + pibt (I.25)
Learning environment:
Inflation learning
E˜tpit+1 = α
f
t E˜
f
t pit+1 + α
e
t E˜
e
t pit+1 (I.26)
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Output learning
E˜tyt+1 = α
f
t E˜
f
t yt+1 + α
e
t E˜
e
t yt+1 (I.27)
Learning rules:
E˜ft pit+1 = pi
∗ (I.28)
E˜ft yt+1 = y
∗ (I.29)
E˜et pit+1 = θpit−1 (I.30)
E˜et yt+1 = θyt−1 (I.31)
Weights
αfpi,t =
exp(γU fpi,t)
exp(γU fpi,t) + exp(γU
e
pi,t)
(I.32)
αfy,t =
exp(γU fy,t)
exp(γU fy,t) + exp(γU
e
y,t)
(I.33)
αepi,t ≡ 1− αfpi,t =
exp(γU epi,t)
exp(γU fpi,t) + exp(γU
e
pi,t)
(I.34)
αey,t ≡ 1− αfy,t =
exp(γU ey,t)
exp(γU fy,t) + exp(γU
e
y,t)
(I.35)
Utilities:
U fpi,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[pit−k−1 − E˜ft−k−2pit−k−1]2 (I.36)
U fy,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[yt−k−1 − E˜ft−k−2yt−k−1]2 (I.37)
U epi,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[pit−k−1 − E˜et−k−2pit−k−1]2 (I.38)
U ey,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[yt−k−1 − E˜et−k−2yt−k−1]2 (I.39)
Shocks
Monetary policy shock:
rt = rt−1 + γpit + (1− γ)yt +  (I.40)
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II Tables and Figures
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Table II.1: Parameters of the behavioral model and descriptions
Parameter Description Value
Calibrated Calibration
pi∗ The central bank’s inflation target 0
d1 Marginal propensity of consumption out of income 0.5
e1 Coefficient on expected output in investment eq. 0.1
d2 Coefficient on expected output in consumption eq. to match a1 = 0.5 0.5 ∗ (1− d1)− e2
d3 Coefficient on real rate in consumption eq. −0.01
e2 Coefficient on real rate in investment eq. to match a2 = −0.5 (−0.5) ∗ (1− d1)− d3
a1 Coefficient of expected output in output eq. (e1 + d2)/(1− d1)
a
′
1 Coefficient of lagged output in output eq. d2/(1− d1)
a2 Interest rate elasticity of output demand (d3 + e2)/(1− d1)
a3 Coefficient on spread term in output eq. −d3/(1− d1)
b1 Coefficient of expected inflation in inflation eq. 0.5
b2 Coefficient of output in inflation eq. 0.05
c1 Coefficient of inflation in Taylor rule eq. 1.5
ψ Parameter of firm equity −0.02
τ Firms’ leverage 1.43
αd Fraction of nominal GDP forecast in expected future dividends 0.2
β Bubble convergence parameter 0.98
c2 Coefficient of output in Taylor equation 0.5
c3 Interest smoothing parameter in Taylor equation 0.5
δ Depreciation rate of capital 0.025
α Share of capital in production 0.3
Ψ Adjustment cost function in investment 0.5
γ Switching parameter in Brock-Hommes (or intensity of choice parameter) 1
ρ Speed of declining weights in memory (mean square errors) 0.5
z Technological development parameter 0.5
ξ Parameter 1 in the utilization cost function 0.8
ξ1 Parameter 2 in the utilization cost function 0.3
ξ2 Parameter 3 in the utilization cost function 0.25
z Std. deviation of nom. Interest rate shock 0.5
ρk AR process of shock to utilization cost function 0.1
Parameters specific to the MBF model
n¯ Number of shares in banks’ balance sheets 40
n˜ Initial value for number of firms’ shares 60
e Equity premium 0.05
Parameters specific to the BBF model
δb Depreciation rate of bank capital 0.1049
κnb Leverage deviation cost 11.07
ϑB Target capital-to-loan ratio 0.09
κb Adjustment costs in loan rate setting 13
κd Adjustment costs in deposit rate setting 3.50
ς Banks’ capital-to-asset ratio 0.09
adj Other adjustment costs 0.5
b Bank’s market power in loan rate setting 3.12
d Bank’s market power in deposit rate setting −1.46
β Intertemporal discount rate 0.9943
n¯b Initial (period t=0) bank capital 1
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Table II.2: Model correlations - comparisons
Correlations MBF behavioral model BBF behavioral model US data
ρ(yt, yt−1) 0.86 0.89 0.85
ρ(yt, kt) 0.45 0.78 0.15
ρ(yt, pit) -0.42 -0.40 -0.43
ρ(yt, ast) 0.84 0.83 -
ρ(yt, ψ(ut)) -0.01 -0.58 -
ρ(yt, dt) 0.17 0.70 0.32
ρ(yt, l
s
t ) 0.11 0.16 0.18
ρ(yt, rt) 0.39 0.53 0.45
ρ(yt, it) 0.23 0.26 0.90
ρ(yt, ct) 0.21 0.20 0.32
ρ(yt, st) 0.26 0.23 -0.28
ρ(yt, xt) -0.41 -0.46 -0.49
ρ(yt, ϑt) 0.02 0.03 -
ρ(kt, kt−1) 0.96 0.92 0.88
ρ(kt, ast) 0.32 0.63 -
ρ(kt, ϑt) 0.02 0.02 -
ρ(kt, rt) 0.08 0.54 0.31
ρ(lst , ast) 0.12 0.06 -
ρ(lst , kt) 0.28 0.21 0.38
ρ(lst , xt) -0.09 -0.17 0.26
ρ(pit, pit−1) 0.74 0.82 0.93
ρ(pit, ast) -0.38 -0.30 -
ρ(pit, rt) 0.57 0.47 0.34
ρ(pit, rt−1) 0.49 0.48 0.34
ρ(xt, xt−1) 0.01 0.13 0.68
ρ(xt, ast) -0.12 -0.32 -
ρ(xt, kt) -0.24 -0.47 0.09
ρ(xt, ϑt) 0.01 0.005 -
ρ(ϑt, ast) 0.007 0.05 -
ρ(yt, n
b
t) -0.01 -0.07 0.45
ρ(yt, n
f
t ) -0.02 -0.03 0.22
ρ(nbt , n
b
t−1) 0.99
ρ(rbt , r
b
t−1) 0.93
ρ(rdt , r
d
t−1) 0.74
ρ(yt, r
b
t ) 0.02
ρ(kt, ψ(ut)) 0.27
ρ(pibt, n
b
t) 0.15
ρ(rbt , r
d
t ) -0.04
ρ(pibt, yt) 0.04
Note: GDP deflator was used as the inflation indicator, 3-month T-bill for the
risk-free interest rate, the deposit rate as the savings indicator and the Corpo-
rate lending risk spread (Moody’s 30-year BAA-AAA corporate bond rate) as the
counterpart for the firm borrowing spread in the models. Variables that are left
blank do not have a direct counterpart in the data (deep variables).
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Table II.3: Second moments - compar-
ison
Variable MBF model BBF model US data
yt 2.17 3.34 1
pit 0.35 0.26 0.50
kt 0.42 0.35 1.50
xt 1 1.11 0.18
ast 0.15 0.11 -
dt 3.72 0.92 1.36
lst 5.07 6.62 3.55
rt 0.95 0.84 0.76
it 0.24 0.27 3.08
ψ(ut) 0.24 0.15 -
ϑt 73.89 58.49 -
ct 0.24 0.23 0.81
st 0.24 0.23 8
nbt 4.45 0.14 1.32
nft 73.9 58.48 2.21
St 1.23 0.97 6
Note: The moments are calculated tak-
ing output as the denominator. Following
a standard approach in the DSGE litera-
ture, this is in order to examine the mo-
ments with respect to the general business
cycle.
Table II.4: Third moments - compari-
son
Variable MBF model BBF model US data
yt 0.21 -0.21 0
pit -1.81 1.81 -0.66
kt 1.24 0.81 0.82
xt 20.9 -0.52 -5.8
ast 0.19 -2.62 -
dt -0.52 -1.24 1.36
lst 1.90 1.10 -0.61
rt -4.29 2.29 -1.27
it -7.81 -0.91 1.18
ψ(ut) -0.05 -0.01 -
ϑt 3.89 -146.5 -
ct 7.05 1.14 0.37
st -7.1 -1.2 0.49
nbt -4.43 66.3 -2.34
nft -3.86 -146 -0.34
St -3.33 -147 -
Note: The moments are calculated tak-
ing output as the denominator. Following
a standard approach in the DSGE litera-
ture, this is in order to examine the mo-
ments with respect to the general business
cycle.
40
Table II.5: Fourth moments - compar-
ison
Variable MBF model BBF model US data
yt 10.91 3.25 1
pit 0.36 1.05 3.54
kt 0.37 0.96 1.66
xt 27.9 1.67 58.6
ast 0.18 0.54 -
dt 0.17 0.76 4.54
lst 0.17 0.47 3.75
rt 1.1 1.15 2.38
it 9.54 1.51 0.71
ψ(ut) 0.05 0.16 -
ϑt 53.5 323.7 -
ct 9.79 1.56 0.14
st 9.82 1.56 8.39
nbt 52.66 67.5 9.39
nft 53.52 323.7 16.37
Note: The moments are calculated tak-
ing real GDP as the denominator. These
are calculated using the full sample of
US data stretching from 1953:I - 2014:IV.
During this period, the US economy expe-
rienced 10 cycles (using NBER business
cycle dates), and the average GDP in-
crease per quarter during expansions was
1.05% while it was -0.036% during reces-
sions. Data were de-trended using a stan-
dard two-sided HP filter. The variables
that are left blank do not have a direct
counterpart in the data sample.
Table II.6: Jacques-Bera normality test results
Variable MBF model test statistic Critical value Null hypothesis BBF model test statistic Critical value Null hypothesis
yt 80224 18.67 Reject 19.85 16.56 Reject*
it 908120 18.67 Reject 312.35 16.56 Reject
kt 23262 18.67 Reject 10.7 16.56 Accept*
ct 8369300 18.67 Reject 376.9 16.56 Reject
st 8385400 18.67 Reject 379.8 16.56 Reject
pit 19716 18.67 Reject 61.19 16.56 Reject
St 37927000 18.67 Reject 9417000 16.56 Reject
nft 37914000 18.67 Reject 92040000 16.56 Reject
nbt 37868000 18.67 Reject 39673000 16.56 Reject
rt 190910 18.67 Reject 122.3 16.56 Reject
xt 17489000 18.67 Reject 495.6 16.56 Reject
dt 70.03 18.67 Reject 44.87 16.56 Reject
lst 167.3 18.67 Reject 200.9 16.56 Reject
Note: The results from the Jacques-Bera normality test are reported here. Second to fourth column represent
the results for the MBF model, and fifth to seventh for the BBF version. Numbers above the critical values
imply that the null hypothesis that a particular variable has a normal distribution is rejected. The critical
values are calculated based on a Monte-Carlo simulation. The statistics for most variables (except for asset
prices St, net worth of firms n
f
t , net worth of banks n
b
t , and loan supply l
s
t ) are significantly lower in the BBF
version compared to the MBF one. This confirms the graphical inspection that the ergodic distributions of
BBF model variables is much closer to Gaussian compared to the MBF variables.
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Figure II.1: Full impulse responses to an expansionary monetary policy shock with
95% confidence interval in MBF model. We depict the responses of output, inflation,
interest rate, animal spirits, investment, capital, deposits, and loans.
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Figure II.2: Full impulse responses to an expansionary monetary policy shock with
95% confidence interval in BBF model. We depict the responses of output, inflation,
interest rate, animal spirits, investment, capital.
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Figure II.3: Full impulse responses to an expansionary monetary policy shock with
95% confidence interval in BBF model 2. We depict the responses of deposits, loans,
bank equity, bank leverage, deposit rate, and bank profits.
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Figure II.4: Evolution of the output gap, inflation and interest rate in MBF (left)
vs BBF (right) models. The model is simulated for 500 years but to facilitate the
visibility of the process, we zoom in 25 of those years.
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Figure II.5: Evolution of the capital, asset prices and utilization costs in MBF (left)
vs BBF (right) models 2
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Figure II.6: Evolution of the cash-in-advance, net worth of firms and the external
financing spread in MBF (left) vs BBF (right) models 3.
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Figure II.7: Histograms of output gap, inflation and animal spirits in MBF (left) vs
BBF (right). The histograms are calculated using a simulated sample of 500 years.
The histograms can also be interpreted as ergodic distributions. See De Grauwe and
Gerba (2015) for an analysis of the sime in frequency domain.
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Figure II.8: Histograms capital prices, asset prices and utilization costs in MBF
(left) vs BBF (right) 2. The histograms are calculated using a simulated sample of
500 years. The histograms can also be interpreted as ergodic distributions.
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Figure II.9: The first two graphs depict the fraction of the total population of
agents that use the extrapolative rule to forecast output-and inflation gap. 1 (or
0) on the vertical axes means that the entire population uses the extrapolative
(fundamentalist) rule to forecast the variable. This can be interpreted as the degree
of regime switches that occur during the agents’ learning process. The third graph
depicts the level of ‘optimism’ and ‘pesimism’ on the stock markets, where 1 is a
pure bullish (or optimistic) market, 0 is a pure bearish (or pessimistic), and 0.5 is
neither (or no sentiment-driven dynamics). Graphs on the left are those of the MBF
version and those on the right are of the BBF.
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